



## Youth and religion in an age of global citizenship identification: An 18-country study of youth<sup>☆</sup>

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### ARTICLE INFO

#### Keywords:

Faith-based organizations  
Religious congregations  
Global citizenship  
Youth  
World Values Survey

### ABSTRACT

The world is becoming more globalized and interconnected. As a result, there is an emphasis on ensuring that the next generation can adapt and work in the budding global industries and new work environments. Faith-based organizations can supplement or complement governmental and familial entities in supporting youth as they grapple with the implications of globalization and global citizenship expectations. Our aim is to study the level of global citizen identification among religious and non-religious youth. Using the World Values Survey, we obtain data pertaining to 18–29-year-olds from 18 countries. We found that youth who identified with religious beliefs and religious practices are less likely to align with global citizenship tenets (e.g. accepts neighbors who are different from themselves), yet more commonly identify themselves as world citizens. These findings indicate that religious beliefs and religious behaviors mediate effects between individuals and global citizenship identifications. In return, religious affiliation may serve as a mediating structure that is instrumental in helping youth function in a world where identifying and living as a global citizen is expected.

### 1. Introduction

Youth (18–29) are a core component in the global workforce, as they are at the threshold of becoming productive, independent citizens. The traditional transition into the workforce was a means to care for themselves and their families. As globalization changes economic, legal, and social engagement between economies, companies, and countries, personal identity has shifted along with youth transition to global citizens. With an increase of global interconnectedness through financial transactions, technological advancements, multi-national corporations, and climate change, more people assume Diogenes' 4th century BCE self-identification as a world citizen (Appiah, 2007). This identification as a world citizen has become a common moniker of social class and social capital. Global citizenship prioritizes the well-being and welfare of others from the local to the global level (Berdan & Berdan, 2013; Carter, 2016). If youth are unaware of it, they may be excluded from both social and economic opportunities afforded to privileged youth who understand the benefits of global citizenship identification (e.g. desired in the workplace, viewed as relevant and modern).

According to the Global Youth Development Index and Report, the global youth population (15–29) is approximately 1.8 billion people

(The Commonwealth, 2016). Facing the impact of globalization, governments' efforts center on complexities of global trade, industry loss, job creation, and market share. However, youth are oftentimes not included in the globalization discussion (Finn, Nybell, & Shook, 2010; Stiglitz, 2018). This exclusion from the global conversation can have negative repercussions for the next generation of youth. Without understanding globalized job markets and sociocultural requirements of a global economy and workforce, youth will be left behind. While some governments (e.g. Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa) have policies and practices set in place to prepare their young citizens for an interconnected world, there are many governments that have not endorsed policies and practices for its youth (Brenzitz & Zysman, 2013; Stiglitz, 2018). In places where no such policies and practices exist, there is a need for additional support from other institutions or groups (i.e. religious institutions, faith-based organizations). This study addresses this need.

Our interest is in identifying the role played by religious beliefs and behaviors in preparing youth to become world citizens. We assess youth's religious and global citizenship identities. Youth (ages 18–29) are noted as a part of the cultural and economic movement of global citizenship, as they are at the prime age to start work, build, and engage

<sup>☆</sup> In this paper, the term youth is preferred. Social scientists argued that adulthood happens later in life, among current generations (Arnett, 2014; Côté, 2006). Therefore, the term youth can range from teens through late 20s.

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in society on all levels—cultural, social, and legal. Therefore, this paper seeks to shed light on how religious beliefs and practices of youth enhance or reduce the likelihood of identifying as global citizens. In this paper, youth range from 18 to 29 which exceeds the United Nations' standard range by 5 years. This decision was made by the authors for three reasons—theory, global inclusion, and secondary data limitations. The age range was extended in alignment with the emerging adulthood theory literature that highlights that youth are not transitioning into independent adulthood as early as previous generations (Arnett, 2014; Côté, 2006; Swanson, 2016). From a global inclusivity view, youth ages expand as old as 35 years old in countries in Africa and South America (Glassco & Holguin, 2016). This extended age range in different countries around the world center on cultural differences that include youth living within their original family unit until marriage as well as varied ideals about adequate development. Additionally, youth under 18 were not included as there were limitations with the secondary data set not including respondents under 18 years old. With these concepts, we set the youth age range at 18–29 years old.

Religious congregations serve as mediating structures to ensure welfare for individuals and communities, particularly when governments do not provide the resources needed (Berger & Neuhaus, 1977; Evers, 1995; Milofsky & Harris, 2017). We assume that active religious affiliation supports, teaches, and promotes tenets that are associated with global citizenship, even if it has not been their direct intention (Osmer & Dean, 2007). Assuming that religious behaviors and beliefs are carried out in religious congregations or faith-based institutions, the comparison of religious and non-religious youth regarding their level of global citizenship identity will build upon the theory that religious organizations can be supplemental structures, in the absence or limited presence of national policies and governmental support.

Using the World Values Survey (WVS) (Wave 6: 2010–2014) dataset, we captured questions related to religion, global citizenship identification, and other demographic information (e.g. age, socioeconomic status). This paper assesses the findings within 18 countries across Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, Middle East, North America, and South America. In reviewing the WVS data, we assess religious behavior (e.g. service attendance, prayer), religious beliefs (e.g. belief in God, religious importance) and basic demographics (e.g. age, sex, marital status) against their global citizenship identification based on variables that connect to the tenets of global citizenship (e.g. openness to others from different cultures, identifying as a world citizen) (see Fig. 1). The main research question is: How are religious beliefs and behaviors related to identification of global citizenship among youth (ages 18–29), around the world?

## 2. Background

The histories of globalization and global citizenship are steeped in cosmopolitanism, which is centered on urban locations and often prioritizing rural areas, the poor, and minority groups (Furia, 2016; Smith, Laurie, Hopkins, & Olson, 2013). Globalization and its interconnected nature produce global citizens, who include justice and equity in their quest for connectivity. Additionally, globalization is oftentimes linked to governments and corporations circumventing the social, political, and economic structures of smaller countries with minority populations (Korten, 1998; Steger, 2013). Globalization also

connects governments, industries, and cultures across the globe (Al-Rodhan & Stoudmann, 2006). A key component of globalization that is oftentimes overlooked is the need for a nation's citizens to understand the effects of globalization on their everyday lives. Despite globalization's layered and complicated approaches, global citizenship is an outgrowth of globalization that utilizes the interconnectedness to create more positive world outcomes.

### 2.1. Globalization and global citizenship

Global citizenship is centered on how individuals (i.e. global citizens) are aware of the diversity of the world and their own impact on others as it expands from a local to global level, with an emphasis on acceptance, social justice, and equality (Carter, 2016; Oxfam, 2018; UNESCO, 2019). Equally important is the ability of individuals to respect and collaborate with people and experiences from different countries and cultures, while achieving common goals, either as part of a workplace or as human beings sharing the same space. Many scholars contend that global citizenship asks people to see themselves as connected to all human beings—inside their local region and around the globe (Adams & Carfagna, 2006; Rapoport, 2010). Given many cultures, including religious, lack of engagement with others and loyalty to nationalist views, global citizenship is an affront to more closed cultures (e.g. fundamentalist religious sects, anti-globalization sentiments) (Awan, 2016; Harris, 2016). Many groups—religious and non-religious—argue that global citizenship is a part of a quest to force the rest of the world to assimilate to Western views or is antithetical to the post-colonialist frameworks (Andreotti, Mario, & de Souza, 2012; Freire, Freire, & de Oliveira, 2014; Wuthnow & Offutt, 2008). On the other hand, there are arguments that note that the increased interconnectedness of our economies, carbon footprints, and cultures have created a more fluid engagement. Despite the pushback of some cultures, there are large initiatives, such as the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals centered on Education for Sustainable Development and Global Citizenship, that argue that global citizenship education can have an ameliorating effect for issues brought on by globalization (e.g. human rights violations, poverty-based inequalities) (Miladinovic, 2016; UNESCO, 2019). For at least two decades, global citizenship education has been a part of a larger effort to prepare youth for a continually globalizing world (Goren & Yemini, 2017; O'Connor & Faas, 2012).

The importance of understanding one's religion and respecting the lived experiences of others is an integral part of engaging, working, and living in a global society. Tolerance and knowledge of others are imperative for a global workforce, where large issues spanning from opening offices in foreign countries, addressing environmental issues to exporting and importing goods are solved by collaborations between people from different countries and cultures (Carter, 2016; Chidester, 2002). Global professionals develop many of their skills through international volunteerism, language immersion, cultural exchanges, in-class discussions and activities that focus on global issues, and creative problem solving. Some of these lessons are learned in formal settings (e.g. schools, global citizenship education programs) or informally (e.g. traveling with families, foreign nannies). Nonetheless, their economic and cultural capitals are enhanced (Earley & Ang, 2003; Hopkins, Olson, Smith, & Laurie, 2015). With this in mind, religious




Fig. 1. Conceptual illustration of the path analysis model. Note. Continuous arrows are for direct effects. Dashed arrows are for indirect effects.

congregations and organizations have the capacity to be a part of providing globally focused support that is not always provided in other settings (e.g. family units, youth programming).

## 2.2. Role of religious congregations and organizations

Religious congregations ensure the welfare and well-being of a myriad of vulnerable populations (Cnaan & Boddie, 2001). For instance, youth who participate in activities like missions and volunteering—locally and globally—within different communities, are able to inculcate skills and traits that increase their ability to live, work, and engage on a global level. In conjunction with their religious congregations, youth find their own religious growth in planning and executing their mission trips. In these experiences, youth engage with people, cultures, and ideas that they otherwise would not, which has the capacity to increase their cultural awareness and global competency through exposure to and engagement with different people (Berdan & Berdan, 2013; Hopkins et al., 2015). The concept of global citizenship is conceptualized in this paper as people who self-identifying as being connected to, respectful of, and comfortable with others who experience life differently, which aligns with some of the tenets emphasized within the religious missions and travels provided to some youth. Every situation has the capacity to change the way that youth see others and how much their experiences connect them to others within another country, culture, or context, as globalization and global citizenship requests (Berdan & Berdan, 2013). In a qualitative study of youth transitioning into a religious adulthood through their international mission's travel, the coded themes (e.g. justice, development, cross-cultural learning, and teamwork) mirrored some of the values of religion and global citizenship (Hopkins et al., 2015). Many people in religious congregations support foreign missionaries and in turn are exposed to the customs and living conditions in other countries and cultures, which oftentimes centers on social justice, cross-cultural learning, and teamwork are transferable skills for becoming a global citizen. As we highlight the impact of religious engagement as a possible means of interaction with the rest of the world, there are religious experiences that seek to reduce connectivity outside of their cultures (Taylor, 2019; Volf, 2015). Such religious sects promote closed interactions and reduces engagement with different people and cultures. While some may eschew engagement with people outside of their religious ideals, it is not always the case with all religions that prefer a closed religious experience; they simply operate differently. We wanted to be clear with this ideal, as we do not want to oversell the idea that religion is an idyllic, monolithic place for global citizenship education, even though it can.

From the assumption that religious engagement provides opportunities for global citizenship, some of the core religious activities align with global citizenship. In fact, Smith et al. (2013) highlights that youth's "religiosity, as it is expressed through their short-term mission experience, produces a form of cosmopolitanism, but one that circumscribes engagements with justice and inequality" (p. 129). While mission trips and volunteering activities are common within religious communities, not all youth participate in these activities. However, many congregations take part in global engagement without leaving their communities. Clergy commonly use sermons to highlight world affairs (e.g. caring for those in need after natural disasters, wars, or immigration) and discuss cross-cultural accounts found within their sacred texts (e.g. Christian clergy referencing past events that are thought to have taken place in the Middle East) (Santibañez et al., 2017; Stephens, 2017). Religious congregants are presented with information about different groups and cultures based on the experiences of serving as hosts to foreign visitors or refugees, parishioners sharing their own travel experiences back to their religious communities, and/or organizing trips to the holy land or country of ancestry.

## 2.3. Merging globalization, global citizenship, and religious congregations

Beyond engaging in religious activities, individuals take their beliefs and experiences into the larger world. When thinking about youth, their transition from childhood to adulthood is to find work to establish social and economic independence. While this functional transition toward independence is conceptually the same, the approach may be different given the more global approach and shifting requirements. For instance, in a more globalized economy that may require working remotely with people from different countries and cultures, it is important to have the ability to engage with and understand different people (Earley & Ang, 2003; Lee & Sukoco, 2010). Since work continues to be the means for everyday survival (e.g. pays for food, housing) a person's capacity to access and appropriately utilize the behaviors necessary for a new work environment has a different meaning (Chen, Liu, & Portnoy, 2012; Earley & Ang, 2003; Lee & Sukoco, 2010). Given the connection to others, traveling, and exposure to different cultures, cultural intelligence (CQ) is associated with global citizenship and could be looked at when thinking about ways that religious congregations can help youth prepare for their independent adulthood to be a part of a global society.

Given the overlap of global citizenship history and concepts learned and practiced within many religious congregations, this paper seeks to understand how religion and global citizenship ideals align with the youth (ages 18–29). In this attempt, we review variables from the WVS that can best represent global citizen identification, religious behaviors, religious beliefs, and demographics. Based on the above literature review and the assumption that religion can be associated with global citizenship tenets, we hypothesize that youth who score higher on religiosity (i.e. religious behavior and religious beliefs) will score higher within the six global citizenship identifiers than youth with lower religiosity (i.e. religious behavior and religious beliefs) scores.

## 3. Methods

The data for the study was prepared by World Values Survey (WVS), which is a survey managed by a global network of social scientists. The sample (approximately 1200 respondents) for each country are representative of all people over 18 years old within a given country. Surveys are conducted face-to-face within the respondents' residences. While the survey was drafted in English, the survey was administered in the respondents' native language and translated back to English to ensure accuracy (World Values Survey, 2019). Since 1981, the WVS has conducted a survey every four years that captures the beliefs and values of people from almost 100 countries that includes topics centered on civic engagement, organizational membership, social values, science, technology and more. For this paper, Wave 6 (2010–2014) of the WVS was used to analyze how demographics, religious beliefs, and religious behaviors correlate with youth self-identification as global citizens. Across 18 countries, the respondents who were 18–29 years old provided an N = 9,430.

### 3.1. Measures

#### 3.1.1. Dependent variables

Global citizenship was assessed using six separate dependent variables (see Table 1 for exact categories and wording of questions). First, we assessed if the respondent identifies with the following statement: "I see myself as a world citizen."

The variables of *different language* and *different religion* were reported based on whether the respondent mentioned not wanting to have a neighbor with certain characteristics, such as a neighbor who speaks a different language or practices a different religion. In this question, respondents either (0) did not mention any type or (1) mentioned a type of person they would not like as a neighbor. The higher score (1) indicates that the respondent is not displaying global

**Table 1**  
Items in the study, overall means and standard deviations, a preliminary view.

Code	Item label	N	Mean	SD	Scale
<b>Global citizenship identification</b>					
q1	I see myself as a world citizen	8,985	2.16	0.84	Strongly agree (3), Agree (2), Disagree (1), Strong disagree (0)
q2	Could you please mention any [characteristics] you would not like to have as neighbors? Response: Speaks a different language	8,607	0.16	0.37	Mentioned (1) – Not Mentioned (0)
q3	Could you please mention any [characteristics] you would not like to have as neighbors? Response: Practices a different religion	9,430	0.17	0.38	Mentioned (1) – Not Mentioned (0)
q4	The only acceptable religion is my religion	7,998	1.39	1.01	Strongly agree (3), Agree (2), Disagree (1), Strong disagree (0)
q5	People who belong to different religions are probably just as moral as those who belong to mine	8,198	1.86	0.90	Strongly agree (3), Agree (2), Disagree (1), Strong disagree (0)
q6	I trust people of another religion	8,766	1.33	0.87	Trust completely (3), Trust somewhat (2), Do not trust very much (1), Do not trust (0)
<b>Religious beliefs</b>					
q7	Do you believe in God?	8,394	0.87	0.34	Yes (1), No (0)
q8	How much confidence do you have in places of worship?	9,158	1.92	1.03	A great deal (3), Quite a lot (2), Not very much (1), None at all (0)
q10	How essential is as a characteristic of democracy for religious authorities to ultimately interpret the laws?	9,002	0.84	0.82	Essential (2), Somewhat essential (1), Not essential (0)
q11	How important is God in your life?	8,445	1.58	0.72	Very important (2), Somewhat important (1), Not at all important (0)
q12	How important is religion in your life?	9,290	2.13	1.05	Very important (3), Rather important (2), Not very important (1), Not at all (0)
q14	All religions should be taught in our public schools.	8,642	1.63	0.98	Strongly agree (3), Agree (2), Disagree (1), Strong disagree (0)
q15	Whenever science and religion conflict, religion is always right	8,598	1.73	1.03	Strongly agree (3), Agree (2), Disagree (1), Strong disagree (0)
Code	Item label	N	Mean	SD	Scale
<b>Religious behaviors</b>					
q16	Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services?	8,871	3.19	2.22	More than once a week (6), Once a week (5), Once a month (4), Only on special holy days (3), Once a year (2), Less often (1), Never (0)
q17	Are you a religious person?	8,741	1.65	0.58	A religious person (2), Not a religious person (1), An atheist (0)
q18	Are you an active member, of a church or religious organization?	9,310	0.77	0.85	Active (2), Inactive (1), Not a member (0)
q19	How often do you pray?	8,396	4.42	2.58	Several times a day (7), Once a day (6), Several times a week (5), Only when attending religious services (4), Once a year (2), Less than once a year (1), Never (0)
q20	Age, years	9,430	23.68	3.31	18–29
q22	Marital Status	9,430	0.38	0.49	Married (1), Non-married (0)
q23	SES	9,154	0.21	0.41	Upper (1), Lower (0)
q24	Sex	9,422	0.51	0.50	Woman (1), Man (0)

Note: Overall N = 9,430

citizenship tenets.

Next, we assessed whether the respondents viewed their own religion as the only acceptable religion. Similarly, we assessed whether respondents agree that people from different religions are just as moral as people in their own religion. Finally, we assessed whether respondents trusted people from another religion.

### 3.1.2. Independent variables

Two main dimensions of religiosity—religious beliefs and religious behaviors—make up the independent variables.

**3.1.2.1. Religious beliefs.** Religious beliefs are compiled based on the following variables. First, we assessed whether the respondent believed in God—Yes (1) or No (0). Second, we assessed how much confidence respondents had in places of worship. Next, we assessed whether respondents believed the meaning of religion was based on making sense of life after death. Respondents were also assessed based on if it is essential for religious authorities to interpret laws. The importance of God in the respondents' lives was also assessed. Respondents were assessed based on what they believe religion implied (3) to follow religious norms and ceremonies; (2) to do good to other people; (1) both; or (0) neither. The last two questions in the dimension of religious beliefs assessed how much the respondents agreed or disagreed with whether (1) all religions should be taught in public schools, and (2) "whenever science and religion conflict, religion is always right."

**3.1.2.2. Religious behaviors.** Different from religious beliefs, religious behaviors focus on adherents' religious actions. The four variables in this dimension are about *attendance*, *identity*, *membership*, and *prayer*. First, we assessed whether respondents attended religious services or prayed, respectively, apart from wedding and funerals. Respondents

were assessed on how often they prayed. Then, we assessed whether respondents identified as (0) atheist; (1) not a religious person; or (3) a religious person. We recognize that these religious identifiers can be categorized as a religious identification and not religious behavior. For the purposes of this paper, we categorize religious identification under religious behavior, as religious affiliation and identification can connote how people behave and operate within the world—for good or ill (Cogwill, Rios, & Simpson, 2017; Everett, Haque, & Rand, 2016). The membership variable assessed whether the respondent is (0) not a member; (1) an inactive member; or (3) an active member.

### 3.1.3. Control variables

The demographics that serve as control variables are the respondents' age, country, marital status, gender, and socioeconomic status. All respondents were within the age range of 18–29 years old. To ensure geographic and religious diversity, we decided to select 2–3 countries from different regions of the world. In selecting the countries, the respondents from that country had to have answered the "I see myself as a world citizen" statement. There were 59 countries that responded to the world citizen statement. In regions with fewer countries, like Australia and North America all available countries were included. For regions with larger amounts of countries available, the countries were selected based largely on location and distance from the other countries in their region (i.e. Ghana, Rwanda, and South Africa are in the West, Central/East, and Southern regions of the African continent, respectively. While we did not assess religious breakouts of the respondents, the selected countries are known to include various sects of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, Judaism, Sikhism, and more to increase the likelihood of religious diversity. The full list by countries can be found via the World Values Survey Wave 6 data in question V212. The final set of 18 countries were Africa = Ghana,

Rwanda, South Africa; Asia = China, India, and Japan; Australia = Australia; Europe = Germany, Poland, and Spain; Middle East = Egypt, Iraq, and Kuwait; North America = Mexico and United States; and South America = Brazil, Chile, and Colombia.

Respondents were asked about their marital status and were divided into (1) married and (0) unmarried (i.e. divorced, separated, widowed, and single). Similarly, respondents were asked about their socio-economic status (SES)—(0) lower class and (1) upper class. For gender, the respondents had only the options of male (1) or female (0). Finally, respondents identified their religious tradition—with categories such as (0) none, (1) Catholic; (2) Protestant; (3) Orthodox; (4) Jewish; (5) Muslim; (6) Hindu; and (7) Buddhist.

Before going into the data, we highlight the complexity of responses from youth across these 18 countries are as complex as the conceptualization and function of globalization and global citizenship. Identifying as a world citizen can be taken as a socially acceptable reply, especially in a society that is reported as increasing globalized. Taking this realization into account, we highlight that we cannot be sure of the motives or pressures that the respondents were under nor can we decipher whether respondents received information about global citizenship—formally or informally. Recent literature tells us that some youth have received global citizenship education under the term GCE or some other format (Goren & Yemini, 2017; Rapoport, 2010). While we are acknowledging the possibility of identifying as a global citizen with understanding of its complex meanings, we have not adjusted our data and reporting.

#### 4. Data

We used the World Value Survey (WVS) (Wave 6: 2010–2014), available at: <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp> to build a model in which religious beliefs and behavior were expected to explain global citizen identification. The international survey covered several aspects of religious beliefs and behaviors and world citizen identification across 18 countries. Thus, our modeling strategy for this study is structural equation modeling (SEM). This method allowed us to: (1) estimate latent variables for religious behavior and beliefs; and (2) test several simultaneous regression equations which represent alternative hypotheses (Byrne, 2012; Wang & Wang, 2012; Wang, Hefetz, & Liberman, 2017). Moreover, a multilevel versus a multiple-group analysis was considered. For this study, multilevel analysis means that the data appears on two levels: (1) the individual's level data and (2) the country level data. Thus, it allows a within-subject's analysis as well as a between-subjects' analysis (Heck & Reid, 2017). The multiple group analysis is an alternative approach that allows us to compare the individuals' behavior in one country to the others within a measurement invariance framework (Schmitt & Kuljanin, 2008). A list of all possible survey items in the study is presented in Table 1 followed by overall means and standard deviations regardless of the country division.

Several items were rescaled to generate reference groups for comparisons within the analysis. For marital status, we used married (49%) versus unmarried (51%). Similarly, for socio-economic status, we divided SES into two groups—upper class and low class. Respondents who checked affiliation to the upper class (41%) were categorized as upper class, while those that checked affiliation to the lower class or working class were categorized as lower class (59%). Item q10 (focused on democracy and religion) and item q11 (focused on the importance of God) were originally coded from 1 (not essential at all) to 10 (very essential) and recoded to 0 (not at all) to 2 (highly essential) on an ordinal scale (0, 1, 2). Additionally, missing values such as “no answer” and “does not know” were recoded as missing data.

#### 5. Missing data

A key challenge was to treat missing data. However, as the data were collected in each country, the analysis of missing data rates varied. There could be multiple reasons for missing data (e.g. cultural

sensitivity, lack of understanding of terms) (Lechner, Partsch, Danner, & Rammstedt, 2019; McFarland, 2017). While there many some of these cultural and intellectual reasons, we addressed the issue statistically. In this analysis, we tested the random distribution of missing values to assess if missing values were connected to specific variables or observations (Bar, 2017). We conducted an additional test for missing completely at random (MCAR) by country (Allison, 1999, 2003; Little, 1998; Peng, Harwell, Liou, & Ehman, 2007) (the missing data table can be obtained by contacting the first author). The Little's test for missing completely at random shows that not all missing data was at random. As a result, we conducted multiple imputations. In Egypt and Kuwait, several items were not surveyed, which led to our decision to address missing data by country. We imputed data multiple times to ensure non-biased imputation. For the imputation, we used the stochastic regression approach, which generates a random value that substitutes the missing values by using the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster, Laird, & Rubin, 1997; Do & Batzoglou, 2008). Finally, we reconstructed a dataset for all 18 countries in which missing values were imputed.

#### 5.1. Latent factors

One important finding is the high rate of believing in God across all respondents: 87 percent reported that they believe in God, which means that the use of this indicator for understanding identifications of world citizen is limited due to the small variation. In several countries, this question received 100 percent positive answers. Our experimentation with the imputed data revealed high correlations between religious beliefs and religious behavior (see Table 2). Based on an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) (Hefetz & Liberman, 2017; Osborne, 2014), we defined two dimensions for religiosity—the belief and the behavior. We constructed these two dimensions as latent factors in extended (behavior: q16, q17, q18, q19; beliefs: q8, q11, q12, q15) and reduced

**Table 2**  
Rates of respondents believing in God per country, and association between religious beliefs and behavior as latent variables.

Country Name	Percent Respondents believing in God	Correlation between Religious belief and Religious Behavior Full Factors	Correlation between Religious belief and Behavior Reduced Factors
<b>Africa</b>			
Ghana	1.00	0.76***	0.88***
Rwanda	0.98	0.45***	0.10
South Africa	0.98	0.56***	0.26*
<b>Asia</b>			
China	0.13	0.97***	0.90***
India	0.91	0.67***	0.41***
Japan	0.60	1.00***	0.69***
<b>Australia</b>			
Australia	0.62	0.97***	0.93***
<b>Europe</b>			
Germany	0.45	0.95***	0.86***
Poland	0.92	0.92***	0.96***
Spain	0.63	0.92***	0.88***
<b>Middle East</b>			
Egypt	–	–	–
Iraq	1.00	0.70***	0.68***
Kuwait	–	–	–
<b>North America</b>			
Mexico	0.91	0.87***	0.87***
United States	0.83	0.92***	0.94***
<b>South America</b>			
Brazil	0.98	0.94***	0.85***
Chile	0.89	0.79***	0.72***
Colombia	0.98	0.78***	0.64***

Sig. \*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$ .

**Table 3**  
Multilevel model results, unstandardized coefficients.

	Q19 Religious behavior	Q12 Religious Beliefs	Q1 World Citizen	Q2 Different religion	Q3 Different Language	Q4 Mine only	Q5 Moral	Q6 Trust
Age	0.001 (0.01)	0.007 (0.003)	0.00 (0.003)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)
Married	0.27*** (0.06)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.26*** (0.06)	0.45*** (0.06)	0.05* (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)
Gender (Women)	-0.19** (0.06)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.13* (0.06)	0.16** (0.06)	0.07** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Upper SES	0.42*** (0.07)	0.10** (0.03)	0.06** (0.02)	0.35*** (0.07)	0.30*** (0.07)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.001 (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
Q19	-	-	0.01*** (0.004)	0.02 (0.01)	0.05** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.02** (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Q12	Corr. 0.57*** (0.01)	-	0.10*** (0.01)	0.23*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.04)	0.22*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.009*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.03*** (0.004)	0.03*** (0.006)	0.04*** (0.006)	0.09*** (0.006)	0.03*** (0.003)	0.02*** (0.003)

Sig. \*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$ ; Estimator is maximum likelihood (ML); Corr. – Correlation (shaded cell); Standard errors in parentheses.

(behavior: q16, q19; beliefs: q12, q15) forms. In both forms, we found high correlations between the two latent factors. This means that respondents could not distinguish between the two factors, or in terms of religiosity, could not distinguish between their belief and behavior. Believing in and worshiping God were highly correlated. However, this was slightly reduced when testing the reduced form (e.g., for Japan from 1.00 to 0.69, or for Rwanda from 0.45 to 0.10). These correlations were still high and resulted in multicollinearity when introduced in the structural equations model. Our solution was to use the most distinguished items in the model, which are a pair of items with the lowest correlations and are highly representative for each dimension—belief versus behavior. Correlation between q12 (importance of religion in life) and q19 (how often do you pray) was 0.57 overall; while this correlation is still high, it allowed for further analysis. For the remainder of the paper, the two remaining independent variables—Q12 and Q19—will be operationalized as separate variables, not a composite of a religiosity scale. With the removal of the majority of our variables, instead of SEM, we used a path analysis model, in which all items were observed with no construction of a latent variable. Yet, the overall structure of the model retained.

An attempt to construct a latent factor for world citizen identifications resulted in poor loadings due to original low correlations between the world citizen items (q1 to q6). Items within this content were distinguishable, where correlations did not exceed 0.20, except between q2 and q3.

We illustrated the conceptual path analysis model in Fig. 1. The continuous line arrows represent direct effect (i.e., the background effect on religiosity). The dashed line arrow represents indirect effect (i.e., background effect on world citizen identification via the mediation of religiosity). An indirect effect means that independent variables may affect the mediators, and the mediators affect the dependent variables (Hayes, 2009, 2013). Note that a variable may function as an independent and dependent variable simultaneously within this regression framework. For instance, religious beliefs were regressed on the independent background variables and within the same analytical framework explained world citizen identifications. While structural equation modeling could measure the joint effects of two variables on a dependent variable, there was no difference found leading us to use the simpler causal model of the path analysis (Fig. 1) that shows effects from the background to religiosity to global citizenship based on the likelihood of life experiences. In most childhoods, religion is a part of cultural experience that shapes the beliefs and values of youth, which is likely to impact their behaviors within their religious practice and outside (Hemming, 2016; Krok, 2018). While there is a recent push for global citizenship tenets to be included in childhood and youth development, it is likely that religiosity would proceed one's identification as

a global citizen, which oftentimes comes into effect within the youth transitioning into independent adulthood age (Bersaglio, Enns, & Kepe, 2015; Sukarieh & Tannock, 2014).

## 6. Results

We performed a path model to test the hypothesis (Mplus V.8.0) (Muthén & Muthén, 2017). The primary choice for modeling was a multilevel model, where level one was the individuals' data and level two was the country-level data. However, the small number of countries (N countries equals 16, without Egypt and Kuwait) did not allow for a level-two model. Instead, we performed a level-one path model controlled by level two. In other words, country clusters were weights for the level-one model estimation. The advantage of the multilevel modeling approach over the multiple group comparison is its simplicity. In this model, one set of path coefficients were estimated rather than an individual set per country. However, to complement this estimation, we also ran a by country analysis to assess religiosity effects on world citizen identification. In the latter model, we compared a free multiple group model estimation for each country with a model in which these coefficients were constrained to be equal across all countries to reject the null hypotheses that these effects did not differ by country. In the following tables, we first show direct effect results from the two-level model (see Table 3) and indirect effects (see Table 4).

### 6.1. Multilevel path model results

As illustrated in Fig. 1, the path model is built on a set of regression equations illustrated in Fig. 2. These equations are shown as columns in Table 3, where the first variable in the column indicates the dependent variable in the equation, and the last variable in the column indicates percent variance explained by this regression. First, we see an overall correlation between our religious belief and behavior variables ( $r = 0.57$ ,  $p < .001$ ), which means that regardless of the distinguished items, within the model these items remained highly correlated.

#### 6.1.1. Religiosity

In alignment with our hypothesis, individuals who reported higher religious behavior and religious beliefs, perceived themselves to be higher on the world citizen scale (q19:  $b = 0.01$ ,  $p < .001$ ; q12:  $b = 0.10$ ,  $p < .001$ ; respectively). These positive effects were consistent on additional world citizen identifications, except that q19 (religious behavior) had no significant effect on q2 (accepting neighbors of a different religion) or q6 (trust people of another religion).

**Table 4**  
Multilevel model results, indirect effects.

Independent	Mediator	Dependent	Independent → Mediator	Mediator → Dependent	Direct	Indirect	95%CI
Gender	behavior	Q3Language	-0.19**	0.05**	0.16**	-0.009*	[-0.017, -0.002]
Gender	behavior	Q4 Mine only	-0.19**	0.04***	07**	-0.007**	[-0.011, -0.003]
Gender	behavior	Q5 Moral	-0.19**	0.02**	-0.05**	-0.003*	[-0.005, -0.001]
Gender	behavior	Q1 W. citizen	-0.19**	0.01***	0.03	-0.003*	[-0.005, -0.001]
Married	beliefs	Q2 Religion	0.15***	0.23***	0.26***	0.034***	[0.019, 0.049]
Married	beliefs	Q3 Language	0.15***	0.17***	0.45***	0.025***	[0.012, 0.038]
Married	beliefs	Q4 Mine only	0.15***	0.22***	0.05*	0.033***	[0.022, 0.044]
Married	beliefs	Q5 Moral	0.15***	0.10***	-0.11***	0.015***	[0.009, 0.02]
Married	beliefs	Q6 Trust	0.15***	0.09***	-0.05*	0.014***	[0.009, 0.019]
Married	beliefs	Q1 W. citizen	0.15***	0.10***	0.04*	0.015***	[0.01, 0.021]
Married	behavior	Q3 Language	0.27***	0.05**	0.45***	0.013**	[0.004, 0.022]
Married	behavior	Q4 Mine only	0.27***	0.04***	0.05*	0.01***	[0.005, 0.014]
Married	behavior	Q5 Moral	0.27***	0.02**	-0.11***	0.004**	[0.001, 0.007]
Married	behavior	Q1 W. citizen	0.27***	0.01***	0.04*	0.004**	[0.001, 0.006]
SES	beliefs	Q2 Religion	0.10**	0.23***	0.35***	0.022**	[0.007, 0.036]
SES	beliefs	Q3 Language	0.10**	0.17***	0.30***	0.016**	[0.004, 0.027]
SES	beliefs	Q4 Mine only	0.10**	0.22***	0.01	0.021**	[0.009, 0.033]
SES	beliefs	Q5 Moral	0.10**	0.10***	-0.001	0.009**	[0.004, 0.015]
SES	beliefs	Q6 Trust	0.10**	0.09***	0.11***	0.009**	[0.003, 0.015]
SES	beliefs	Q1 W. citizen	0.10**	0.10***	0.06**	0.01**	[0.004, 0.016]
SES	behavior	Q3 Language	0.42***	0.05**	0.30***	0.02**	[0.007, 0.034]
SES	behavior	Q4 Mine only	0.42***	0.04***	0.01	0.015***	[0.009, 0.021]
SES	behavior	Q5 Moral	0.42***	0.02**	-0.001	0.007**	[0.002, 0.011]
SES	behavior	Q1 W. citizen	0.42***	0.01***	0.06**	0.006**	[0.002, 0.01]

Note. The statistics within this table only highlight the significant outputs found from the regressions displayed in Table 3. Sig. \*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$ .

6.1.2. Age

Unlike the other control variables, age was not significant across any of the dependent or independent variables. More information will be presented in the discussion section. It is, however, worth noting that age was insignificant, even though the age range spanned from 18 to 29. This 12-year age range tends to encompass many life changes (e.g. adolescence, education completion, marriage, and childbearing) that usually shift beliefs and behaviors.

6.1.3. Marital status

When analyzing the marital status, unmarried respondents serve as the reference category. We found significant positive correlations between marital status and the two remaining religious variables and all dependent variables except q5 (moral) and q6 (trust) were negatively correlated (q19:  $b = 0.27, p < .001$ ; q12:  $b = 0.15, p < .005$ ; q1:  $0.04, p < .05$ ; q2:  $b = 0.26, p < .001$ ; q3:  $b = 0.45, p < .001$ ; q4:  $b = 0.05, p < .05$ ; q5:  $b = -0.11, p < .001$ ; q6:  $b = -0.05, p < .05$ ). These coefficients have marginal effects on the dependent variables, when the marital status was married in comparison to non-married individuals. Exceptions are the marital status' effect on whether respondents mentioned not accepting neighbors of a different religion or that speaks a different language. As these dependent variables were dichotomous, the marginal effects are log odds ( $b = \log(p/(1-p))$ ), thus are better interpreted as odds: q2: 1.30; q3: 1.57. In other words, the probability for married individuals that mention not wanting a neighbor that practices a different religion (q2) had 1.30 greater odds of

making this proclamation than that of the non-married individuals. Similarly, married respondents who mentioned not wanting a neighbor who speaks a different language (q3) had 1.57 times greater odds of making that statement than non-married respondents. Overall, married individuals were found to accept neighbors of different religions and different languages less than non-married individuals.

6.1.4. Gender

The gender analysis was conducted with men serving as the reference group. According to the regression results, religious behavior (q19), not wanting a neighbor from a different religion or who spoke a different language (q2 and q3, respectively), identifying one's own religion as the only religion (q4), and assessing people from other religions as just as moral as themselves (q5), were the significant variables. In terms of religious behavior, women reported praying less (q19:  $b = -0.19, p < .01$ ) than men. Additionally, women had a lower probability of accepting different neighbors by religion and language (q2:  $b = 0.13, odds = 1.14, p < .05$ ; q3:  $b = 0.16, odds = 1.17, p < .01$ ). Women better accepted other religions in comparison to men (q4:  $b = 0.07, p < .05$ ) and believed that people from other religions were as moral as people within their own religion in comparison to men (q5:  $b = -0.05, p < .01$ ).

6.1.5. SES

In the socioeconomic analysis, respondents who reported being a part of the upper class were compared to respondents who identified as




Fig. 2. Conceptual illustration of the path analysis model with variable codes. Note. Continuous arrows are for direct effects. Dashed arrows are for indirect effects.

lower class (reference group). Individuals affiliated with the upper class were positively associated with higher religious behavior and religious beliefs, while also perceiving themselves as world citizens (q19:  $b = 0.42, p < .001$ ; q12:  $b = 0.10, p < .01$ ; q1:  $b = 0.06, p < .01$ ). They also reported lower acceptance of possible neighbors who practiced a different religion (q2:  $b = 0.35, odds = 1.42, p < .001$ ) and people who speak a different language (q3:  $b = 0.30, odds = 1.35, p < .001$ ). Upper class respondents, however, were found to trust others even if not from their own religion in comparison to lower class individuals (q6:  $b = 0.11, p < .001$ ).

### 6.1.6. Indirect effects

Fig. 1 suggests that background characteristics affects world citizens indirectly. Table 3 and Table 4 complement each other. While Table 3 shows regression coefficients across the dependent variables and independent variables, Table 4 presents these indirect effects, which are the result of the equation structure. In most cases, these indirect paths, through which one of the background characteristics (left column) affected one type of world citizen identification (third column), were found as additional effects to the direct effect. Hence, the effect from the independent variable to the dependent was significant (sixth column) and the indirect effect (seventh column) complemented the direct effect. For instance, women reported lower religious behavior (i.e. prayer) and were less tolerant of neighbors who speak a different language in comparison to men.

Beyond this type of complementary effects, a complete indirect effect is a case that shows no significant association between the independent and the dependent variables directly, whereas indirectly it is explained by the mediation of the mediator variable. For example, we could not find a significant effect between gender and the world citizen measurement (Table 3). Instead, the indirect effect was found significant (q1: indirect =  $-0.003, p < .05$ ) (Table 4). Women who reported less religious behavior were more likely to report lower identification as world citizens. In comparison to respondents affiliated with the lower class, upper class respondents reported higher religious beliefs, while also considering their own religion as the only acceptable religion (q4: indirect =  $0.021, p < .01$ ). Similarly, the upper-class respondents considered their religion as more moral (q5: indirect =  $0.009, p < .01$ ). These two indirect effects also appeared when religious behavior was found to mediate the association between upper class respondents versus lower class respondents on their own religious superiority, and its moral superiority (q4: indirect =  $0.015, p < .001$ ; q5: indirect =  $0.007, p < .01$ , respectively). This entails a careful interpretation of the results, as alternative pathways may provide different explanations to the relationship between religious behavior, religious beliefs, and world citizen identifications.

### 6.2. Multiple group comparison

To this point, we have considered all respondents as a general population without any country distinction. A multiple group analysis approach compares between all countries and provides country-by-country estimates for the same paths. The multiple group framework tests whether these different estimates vary significantly or are similar to the extent that minimal reduction in the overall model fit will result from constraining these estimates to be equal across all countries in the model (see notes from Table 5).

When reviewing correlations between individual countries compared to all the other countries, there was as an extreme range from low (0.02 in Egypt) to high (0.76 in Australia). All of the correlations were significant, except for Egypt (0.02). Reviewing the correlations in low (less than 0.33), medium (0.34–0.66), and high (0.67 to 1.00), there was a range of correlation levels. African countries—Ghana (0.14), Rwanda (0.08), and South Africa (0.11), two Asian countries—China (0.18) and India (0.09) — two Middle Eastern countries— Egypt (0.02) and Kuwait (0.11)—and two South American countries—Chile (0.22)

and Colombia (0.29) were on the low end of correlation levels. Countries that correlated in the middle range were Japan (0.43), Germany (0.65), Poland (0.63), Spain (0.49), Iraq (0.40), Mexico (0.36), and Brazil (0.43). The United States (0.68) and Australia (0.76) were highly correlated with the other countries.

In most countries, the associations between religiosity and world citizenship were found to be insignificant. World citizenship identification, while only one component of the global citizenship latent variable, is a key marker to assess global citizenry's reach. Across countries, it is not as widespread as the aggregated data suggests across youth respondents who are married, women, and upper SES.

While global citizenship variables were less significant, there were clear connections to religious beliefs and behaviors across the different countries. Similar to the aggregated data of individuals, the consensus of not wanting neighbors who spoke different languages and/or practiced different religions was consistent across many countries. In several countries, higher religious behavior or beliefs indicated superior perceptions of personal religions (i.e., China, India, Japan, Australia, Poland, Spain, Iraq, Mexico, United States, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Kuwait), whereas in Germany, higher religious behavior was associated with lower superiority perception. The higher religious beliefs (i.e., religion is important) were associated with higher superiority perceptions, which means that they believe that their religion is the only religion. Moral superiority of one's own religion was significant among respondents from Rwanda, South Africa, China, India, Japan, and Germany, in response to higher religious beliefs or behavior. However, in Chile, although reporting religious superiority, respondents were ready to trust others from different religions. Among respondents from India, higher religious behavior was associated with lower trust of others, whereas higher religious beliefs were associated with higher trust. Overall, the probability of not accepting neighbors from a different religion or speaking a different language is reduced if religious behavior or beliefs were higher (i.e., Rwanda, South Africa, India (higher beliefs), Japan, and Brazil). Conversely, the probability is increased in response to the same higher levels of religious behavior and beliefs in other countries (i.e., Iraq, India (behavior)).

## 7. Discussion

Using the World Values Survey dataset, we extracted data on youth (ages 18–29) from 18 different countries. We selected relevant variables related to global citizenship, religious beliefs, religious behaviors, and demographic variables. When analyzing the independent variables (i.e. religious beliefs, religious behaviors), there was high correlation, small variation, and large sample sizes, which impacted the statistical significance levels of the independent variables and explained regression model variances (Lin, Lucas, & Shmueli, 2013). Consequently, we were left with one religious belief variable (q12 = How important is religion in your life?) and one religious behavior variable (q19 = How often do you pray?). As such, we focused on the correlations of these two variables with six measures of global citizenship while moderating the impact of the demographic variables.

We evaluate the concept of global citizenship identification as a sense of self-defining one as a world citizen paired with how respondents feel about people from different backgrounds. Consequently, we also focus on how comfortable people are with having neighbors who spoke a different language or practiced a different religion. Additionally, we assess how respondents rate the morality and trustworthiness of people from different religions. Overall, despite identifying as religious and world citizens, young people are uneasy about the diversity of language and religion.

Within this group of youth, age was insignificant. This suggests that this cohort is unified in its approach to global citizenship identification. It commonly takes about a generation or two for there to be widespread shifts that will accept one's neighbors who are ethnically and religiously different (Adams & Carfagna, 2006). In future World Values Survey

**Table 5**  
Country by country modeling results.

		Correlation	Q1 World Citizen	Q2 Different religion	Q3 Different Language	Q4 My religion only	Q5 Other religion are moral	Q6 Trusting people of other religion
Ghana	Behavior	0.14***	0.01	-0.02	-0.003	0.05	-0.02	0.02
	Belief		0.09	0.09	0.17	-0.08	-0.12	-0.01
Rwanda	Behavior	0.08*	0.03*	-0.04	-0.06	-0.06***	-0.02	-0.002
	Belief		0.06	0.23	-0.53**	0.09*	0.15**	0.20***
South Africa	Behavior	0.11***	-0.01	-0.08*	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	Belief		0.10***	0.14	0.08	0.06	0.15***	0.23***
China	Behavior	0.18***	0.07*	0.01	0.02	0.17***	0.14***	0.07**
	Belief		-0.04	0.32	0.22	0.12**	0.11	0.002
India	Behavior	0.09**	-0.003	-0.02	0.06*	0.01	0.01	-0.03*
	Belief		0.09**	0.02	-0.15*	0.22***	0.10**	0.07*
Japan	Behavior	0.43***	0.003	0.12	-0.08	0.06*	0.004	0.08**
	Belief		0.03	-0.60**	0.19	0.08	0.25***	0.04
Australia	Behavior	0.76***	0.03	-6.18	0.25	0.03	0.05	0.03
	Belief		0.04	-9.98	-0.79	0.34***	-0.12	0.07
Germany	Behavior	0.65***	-0.04	0.04	0.07	-0.15*	0.15*	0.11
	Belief		0.09	0.02	0.004	0.24***	-0.02	0.06
Poland	Behavior	0.63***	0.05	0.81	0.23	0.08**	0.001	0.06
	Belief		-0.004	0.80	-1.70	0.14*	-0.03	-0.08
Spain	Behavior	0.49***	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.15*	-0.07	-0.08
	Belief		-0.02	-0.03	-0.18	0.07	-0.08	0.06
Iraq	Behavior	0.40***	-0.01	-0.07	-0.06	0.04*	-0.03	0.01
	Belief		0.29**	0.79**	-0.03	0.43***	-0.03	-0.06
Mexico	Behavior	0.36***	0.004	0.10*	-0.06	0.03*	0.004	0.01
	Belief		0.02	-0.20	-0.09	0.08*	0.01	0.08*
United States	Behavior	0.68***	-0.001	0.15	-0.04	0.00	-0.001	-0.01
	Belief		0.09	-0.42	0.05	0.36***	0.01	0.10*
Brazil	Behavior	0.43***	0.01	-0.32*	-0.14	0.06***	0.04	0.01
	Belief		0.05	0.49	0.13	0.09*	-0.001	0.07
Chile	Behavior	0.22***	-0.04	0.39	0.40	0.11**	-0.01	0.12***
	Belief		0.12*	-0.32	-0.47	0.10	0.08	0.14**
Colombia	Behavior	0.29***	-0.003	-0.10	0.002	0.01	0.02	0.02
	Belief		-0.03	0.39	0.41	0.15**	0.06	0.03
Egypt <sup>1</sup>	Behavior	0.02	0.57	-	-0.29	-	0.18	-0.27
	Belief		0.32	-	-0.33	-	-0.12	-0.13
Kuwait <sup>1</sup>	Behavior	0.11*	0.03	-	-0.01	0.18**	-0.05	-0.30***
	Belief		0.05	-	0.43	0.66***	-0.22*	-0.01

**Multi Group Results (for the linear equations):**

**Unconstrained Model:** CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.000,  $\chi^2 = 55.02$ ,  $df = 64$ ,  $p = .78$ , SRMR = 0.010.

**Constrained Model:** CFI = 0.561, TLI = 0.510, RMSEA = 0.067,  $\chi^2 = 1925.95$ ,  $df = 559$ ,  $p < .001$ , SRMR = 0.107 (religiosity correlation and effects on world citizen identifications were set equal).

Sig. \*\*\*  $p < .001$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*  $p < .05$ .

<sup>1</sup> In these countries not all variables were available.

(WVS) reports, it will be interesting to see how and if youth will report a significance in their responses. However, it is notable that identification as world citizens is an option that respondents selected regardless of their age.

Marital status and gender are directly and indirectly correlated with the global citizenship identification measures (see Table 4). Marital status was significant across both religiosity variables and all of the global citizen variables. It highlighted that more married people prayed, believed in God, and identified as global citizens. However, they also saw people of different religions as less moral and less trustworthy. While married people may be older and have more conservative viewpoints, this is a difficult claim for this study as age was not significant across any of the other. From a gender perspective, women were more likely to mention not wanting neighbors who spoke different languages or practiced a different religion. Also, there was a significant difference when noting that women saw people of other religions as less moral than they were, which paired appropriately with women within this study noting their own religion was the only acceptable religion. In addition to the aforementioned feelings about diverse neighbors and people of different religions, women's world citizen identification was insignificant compared to men. These outcomes of women being less behaviorally religious and less accepting than men does not align with the traditional assessments of women, mothers, and daughters being religious, pious, and accepting as noted in previous

studies (Nyhagen & Halsaa, 2016; Regnerus, 2003). Our understanding of this shift aligns with studies where scholars argue that women's religious connections were androcentric and did not adequately include women's voices, so their responses made them appear more pious (Ruether, 2017; Ruspini, Bonifario, & Corradi, 2018). Considering past scholarship and changing communities and expanded experiences for women, there is a cultural shift where women may not be as limited to the societal standards that heavily linked them to religious duty and required undying support of others. As a result, women may be more apt to respond differently than they did in the past. In terms of not wanting diverse neighbors, this may be explained by cultures that have limited exposure to them and in turn encouraged women to be more fearful of strangers who live in close proximity.

Unsurprisingly, members of higher SES reported connecting more to the world citizenship tenets than people from lower SES backgrounds. Despite reporting religion as important and praying regularly, respondents with higher SES mentioned not wanting people from different religions or who spoke different languages as neighbors. They did, however, report trusting people from different religions. This disparity appears to be because high SES people have more diverse interactions (e.g. traveling, working) outside of their communities (Czaika, de Haas, & Villares-Varela, 2018). However, respondents with higher SES do not want that diversity within their neighborhood. Despite this, the identification as world citizens and the otherwise

amicable feelings of morality and trustworthiness toward people who are different is common among people with the privilege of deciding who is in their surroundings. Similar to the age demographic, future cohorts of World Values Survey data may report change over time.

While the aforementioned demographic results (Table 3) were significant across global citizenship variables (e.g. world citizen identifying (q1), people from other religions are moral (q5) and trustworthy (q6)), this was not true at the country level. When assessing each country (Table 5), only five countries (i.e. Chile, China, Iraq, Rwanda, and South Africa) of the 18 countries showed significance when either religious behavior or religious belief was regressed on the variable reporting on world citizen identification (q1). Similarly, q5 and q6 had lower significant responses across all countries. On the negative side, the youth were more likely to not want neighbors who practice different religions (q2) and spoke different languages (q3); however, at the country level, very few reported the same sentiments. Fifteen of the 18 countries (all except Egypt, Ghana, and South Africa) found significant results in q4 (my religion is the only religion), when regressed on either religious behavior or religious belief. This country-level assessment suggests that religion within an individual country does not show religion to be a gateway to world citizenship. However, when assessing the aggregated data, youth are more likely to align with more of the world citizenship tenets, especially the identification variable (q1). Overall, it suggests that youth are identifying with global citizenship tenets as a whole, but there may be opportunities within the bounds of their larger communities.

## 8. Conclusions

While globalization and identification with world and global citizenship tenets are not new, with time their importance has grown and tracking the responses of youth's connection to these concepts is a new field of study. Based on the WVS data, 72% of 9,000 + youth (ages 18–29) from 18 countries reported to identify with the statement that they were world citizens. This statistic seems very promising given the many studied countries. Global identification was taken alongside other identifications, such as being a citizen of their nations or regions. Therefore, these respondents had the opportunity to form an identity that is simultaneously very local and global. However, when given the opportunity to note the types of people they did not want to live next to them, many youth noted aspects of people's lives (e.g. religion, language) that would signify that they were not aligning with the global citizenship tenets. These responses, also, stand in contrast with the trends that today's youth are more connected to each other, are more accepting of those who are different, and are preparing to live, work, and play in more diverse settings than their parents and grandparents. Some of the changes may be true in comparison to past generations, but there are work opportunities to close the chasms between identifying as a world citizen and a religious person, but not accepting of others from different religions and who speak different languages.

Before any examples of responses to this chasm, an assessment of how and why religion should be included in the study is warranted. Religion was prioritized, because of their moral and social connection to response to social and political issues (e.g. poverty alleviation, job creation, political upheaval, social concerns). This ideal of care from religious congregations is centered in many faith traditions (Scott & Cnaan, 2018). Reviewing the WVS responses, religious-based and global citizenship related questions were included. The global citizenship tenets require an awareness and acceptance of the world's diversity (Berdan & Berdan, 2013; Carter, 2016; UNESCO, 2019). Youth from the study reported that while they are aware of world citizenship identification, acceptance of the world's diversity has not been fully adopted.

In response, this study calls for a return to the historical responses of religious congregations serving as mediating structures through social and cultural shifts. Viewing globalization as a continuing phenomenon paired with global citizenship as a skill for economic and social success

for youth, religious congregations and organizations have a new opportunity to serve as mediating structures. Religious congregations can: (1) learn more about if and why youth in their congregations and wider religious traditions identify as global or world citizens; (2) use lessons learned from the inquiry about youth in their proximity to use community and corporate collaborations as means of providing base information to engage other youth to talk about how globalization and global citizenship affects their lives; (3) partner with community organizers, educators, and corporations to create culturally competent curricula centered on globalization and global citizenship (e.g. UNESCO programming); and (4) use sermons, homilies, and youth/young adult programming to support community building and cultural diversity knowledge building. For those who work with youth outside of a religious setting, this information can be most useful in understanding that many youths around the world and likely within one's own community have an added identity of global citizenship that is not benign. It has the implication of their ability to engage in the workforces that require global citizenship tenets as a set of soft skills, as well as an effect on how they engage in the larger society—for good or ill. Therefore, for all those interested in, supportive of, and responsible for youth, this paper offers a glimpse into youth's religious, cultural, and social, and economic identities. For practical purposes, professionals can use this information to update their discussions on how youth identify within the larger systems and offer more opportunities for youth to be more engaged with diverse people and cultures. When thinking about planning to transition from youth to independent adulthood, youth will need people who understand that the job market and expectations include the global components required. As this paper suggests, religion can be a place to start those conversations. More suggestions are possible, which can be expanded in community-based discussions and work with youth, congregations, corporate, and community-based organizations. The aforementioned suggestions, however, are initial ways that religious congregations can expand and support youth, as they face a global society.

## 9. Limitations

Our study is based on secondary data from a cross-sectional study from 2010 to 2014, where we could not ask our own questions. For example, we could not ask whether respondents' places of worship addressed globalization-related topics. Additionally, we could not include questions from validated global citizen/ship scales (Morais & Ogden, 2010; Reysen & Katzarska-Miller, 2013). As a result, we utilized the individual questions that aligned with global citizenship but analyzed them as single-item measures, instead of the preferred multi-response measure. Subsequent cohorts may be better prepared for cross-cultural success and global participation. While we were able to include 18 countries from most regions of the world, we were still limited to countries included in the WVS. Some countries (i.e. Canada) that we were interested in were not surveyed or were not asked the specific questions of interest. Finally, multicollinearity among the religious variables left only two of the 18 variables as viable options to analyze. The two variables were significantly correlated (0.57). We suspect an instrumental issue or that religious people answer more uniformly.

## Declaration of Competing Interest

We declare that we have no conflict of interest.

## Appendix A. Supplementary material

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.childyouth.2020.104754>.

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